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Adelaide Cole' s tragic case encapsulates this article' s focus on the way ideas of occult influence intersected with medical science in late Victorian and Edwardian courtroom narratives. I argue that under the scrutiny of the developing field of mental science there were sustained attempts to shift the occult from an object reality to mere signifier and symptom of mental states. Relocating the preternatural from external to internal influence mounted a challenge to its ontological nature, transforming fear of occult influence by others into anxiety about one' s own loss of internal control. This attempted repositioning of occult beliefs helped to draw such ideas into a realm of diagnosis and treatment for mental doctors while serving to make them legally comprehensible as signs of insanity to lawyers. Moreover, while medical "experts" could influence a jury' s decision, they were not authoritative enough in this period to impose a hegemonic interpretation of occult phenomena in the courtroom. Nor, despite the suggested mutual benefits for medical men and lawyers, was there an unproblematic alliance between the professions, for older legal definitions of insanity continued to assert themselves over evolving medical ones. Various actors within the courtroom process, from the accused and victims to lawyers, medical experts, and jurors, all played a role in encouraging, manipulating, or impeding the effectiveness of this epistemological shift. At a time when the boundaries of the occult blurred toward (pseudo)science and those of evolving mental science were still being formulated, the Old Bailey bore witness to the medical destabilizing but not comprehensive overthrow of occult epistemologies.
Historiographical consideration of occult practices in a legal context has tended to focus on changing state relations and shifting legal and public attitudes towards such ideas. 2 Despite the rich body of interdisciplinary scholarship relating to the law and psychiatry, and developing work on medicine and hypnotism, there appears surprisingly little sustained attempt to explore the relationship between the Victorian occult, medical science, and the law. 3 Scholarly analysis of fin de siècle anxieties about occult threats to the will and the permeability of the self has largely remained located in studies of psychical research and late nineteenth-century gothic literature. When those concerns have extended to medical debates about mesmerism or telepathy they have tended to dwell on pseudoscientifictheorizations. 4 Unlike previous studies, then, this article advances an appreciation of the ways medical discourses about occult influence had legal application and consequence for those who found themselves in court. In his persuasive study of telepathy, Luckhurst argued that mind reading and related psychical phenomena developed in a late nineteenth-century cultural moment of "suspended theorisations." 5 By focusing on a legal rather than scholarly context, I will demonstrate that the law court was a site where occult and scientific theorizations could not remain suspended but were necessarily contested or asserted. As Burnett notes, the law court was a "site for the production of social facts," a cultural locale that "to a significant extent shaped both the theories and the practices of knowledge production central to the emergence of modern science." 6 The occult was transformed by medical observations and inferences that naturalized it, not unproblematically, into expressions of abnormal or defective psychological states. As such, this article offers a reading of both how and how successfully medical experts were able to employ occult ideas as semiotic signals within courtroom narratives. 7 The originality of this article lies in exploring a medical meta-reading of the occult, focusing not so much on acts and beliefs as on how their presence in courtroom testimony was used by medical authorities and others. In doing so it offers a fresh insight into how we might read the occult in legal cases and how such ideas were situated in a period of epistemological uncertainty for both mental science and the occult.
The methodological reasons for focusing on an analysis of Old Bailey court records are twofold. First, the Proceedings of the Old Bailey (henceforth POB) provide rich, detailed sources for accessing medical attitudes toward the occult in criminal cases in late Victorian and Edwardian London. Although they consist of edited and sometimes truncated summaries of court testimony, they demonstrate how the court interpreted occult ideas as evidence of motive, psychological state, and mental health. 8 Second, the court' s need to fit occult beliefs into legal strictures means that cases are largely devoid of the overt editorializing that often accompanied press reports on such cases. Although obviously not immune to the broader cultural biases of the period, unspoken predilections (of judges and jurors), or a priori assumptions that suited the agendas of doctors and lawyers, the Old Bailey will be considered as a space in which the legal framework served to filtered out much of the sensationalist rhetoric regarding occult ideas and practices in this period. 9 This allows the historian to engage with a more composed approach to the preternatural, albeit one founded on an inherent privileging of legal and, to a degree, medical interpretations of the occult.
This study of influence and uncertainty in the late Victorian mind consists of three parts. The first part examines belief in occult influence as an instigator of criminal actions and the way this destabilized the boundaries between criminal and victim. In doing so, it indicates how the accused were themselves sometimes aware of an epistemological shift in occult explanations and instrumental in employing it for their own defense. The second part considers how medical experts situated occult-inspired crimes as derived from mental defects, thereby rendering the occult into a signifier of psychological abnormality. This resulted in a blurring of boundaries between prisoner and patient and cast doubt on the accused' s legal culpability for their actions. The last part considers the effectiveness of courtroom medical experts in advancing this internalization of occult beliefs. This draws attention to the fractures within and limitations of scientific rhetoric in this context, and also notes the influence of other key courtroom actors in determining the impact and effectiveness of this rhetoric, especially jurors. This study concludes with broader reflections on the parallels among occult influence, medical discourse, and court procedure, suggesting that while acting as agents of disenchantment both legal and medical authorities exerted influences akin to the very occult phenomena they sought to dispel.
blurring the occult criminal/victim
The late nineteenth-century British legal system did not accommodate the supernatural as a reality. Ever since the 1736 Witchcraft Act, supported through alterations to the Vagrants Act in 1824, claims to powers of witchcraft, fortune-telling, and other forms of occult knowledge were deemed fraudulent. 10 However, reference to remote occult influences continued to appear in court cases between 1860 and 1910, often as justification for crimes. This was especially the case when the supposed victims of occult control had resorted to violent attempts to reassert their will against such influence. This, and an attendant blurring of the boundaries between occult victim and criminal, is evident in the trial of Charles Tilbrook in 1862.
On Sunday, 13 April 1862, Tilbrook violently assaulted his grandmother, Mary King, in her home in Charles Street, Westminster. Believing that she influenced him "by devilish arts," he had attacked her with a razor and a stick, inflicting such wounds to her face and head that she spent seven weeks in hospital. In court Tilbrook claimed, "I did not intend to take her life; I only intended to draw some of her blood. It is evident she is connected with the devil. There have been persons connected with the devil who have done things of witchcraft, though it is not believed in at this day." Directly addressing the issue of occult control, Tilbrook stated, "She should not have that power over me which she has done with her . . . arts. . . . The reason I took upon me to revenge my own wrongs, was because I expected I should get very little redress from the law, because people consider themselves so much enlightened in these days that they do not believe in such a crime, but I do." 11 Tilbrook' s case nicely demonstrates how the mid-nineteenth-century occult was situated in a legal framework. The law' s rejection of the reality of supernatural powers meant the folkloric tradition of drawing blood to break a witch' s spell was translated in this case into a charge of "breaking the peace" and "wounding with intent to murder." The law did not punish occult beliefs per se but rather the way they manifested as criminal behaviors. In court, occult beliefs had to be orientated within the confines of legal statutes and precedents, their unusual nature fitted in to contested narratives that revolved around intentions, actions, and consequences. Tilbrook was a rarity in his willingness to state what he had tried to do, given that the law could no longer provide legal redress against bewitchment. In doing so, he provides us with an early example of the accused articulating a perceived epistemological shift in occult belief (and accompanying legal changes that "forced" him to take matters into his own hands) in the service of his defense. Unlike in later cases discussed below, Tilbrook' s actions were not given a psychological interpretation by medical experts. There was scope for doing so, for developing understandings of the complexity of madness in the early Victorian period had led to a belief in bewitching being interpreted as a sign of monomania, a fixation on one particular delusion. 12 However, in Tilbrook' s case the court seemed to work from an assumption that his actions had been the consequence of irrational "superstition" rather than evidence of mental illness. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.
In the last quarter of the century expressions of fear of external control gradually transitioned from Tilbrook' s traditional accounts of bewitching to the psychical influence of mesmerism and then hypnotism. Despite a shift in occult explanation from bewitchment to mesmerism, the case of William Burns strongly resonates with that of Tilbrook thirty years earlier. In February 1891 Burns was similarly charged with the crime of wounding with intent to murder, although in this case it was his wife, Louisa, in their home in Horseferry Road, Westminster. Burns' s wife testified that, unable to find work as a scaffolder since Christmas, her husband had become prone to sudden violence, believed he was being pursued, and "several times alluded to being under the influence of mesmerism." Following an attempt to cut his daughter' s throat in early February he had been confined to the lunatic ward in the Fulham workhouse for several weeks. While there, the medical officer of the workhouse thought he was "suffering from the effects of insanity" and, despite improved behavior that resulted in his release, felt that "his condition was such that he would be subject to attacks of insanity at times." These concerns were justified, for upon his release Burns attacked his wife with a hammer and chisel, leaving her hospitalized for a month. When charged he stated, "I believe I have been mesmerised; in fact, I know I have. . . . I was mesmerised yesterday with sixpence on the mantelpiece and bits of elastic and old rags." As such, both the accused and his victim were willing to introduce the notion of his being under mesmeric control. There are hints that they were employing mesmeric belief or delusion as an indicator of temporary madness, for Louisa stated that she was "very anxious to have him back" from the lunatic ward and her testimony displays no obvious bitterness toward him, despite her horrific injuries. Philip Gilbert, the medical officer at Holloway Prison, also advanced the idea that Burns had suffered from a bout of temporary insanity. He and Burns actually entered into a supportive exchange in the courtroom, with Burns asking Gilbert, "Have I not behaved myself, and done whatever I am told?" to which the medical officer replied, "You have; I had no occasion to put a straightjacket on you." Despite this, the jury rejected the claim of temporary insanity, finding him "guilty but insane." Consequently, Burns was detained.
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Although occult expressions of external control evolved over the period of our study, they remained underpinned by a persistent concern for the sovereignty of individual will and feared loss of volition over one' s mind and body. To appreciate the significance of these fears and the criminal actions they inspired, one has to recognize the value placed on willpower in a late Victorian culture that "stressed the integrity of the individual and an emphasis on self-control." 14 Given the Victorians' assertive drives, be it over self, nature, or society, the emphasis on willpower took myriad forms. At the start of our period it was being promoted by Samuel Smiles as the driving force behind the self-made man, and by the end, amid developing notions of the fragmented psyche and crowd psychology, willpower was being viewed as a defense against personal and social disintegration.
It was in this later nineteenth-century context that learned debates and sensationalized claims about hypnotism gained medical and public attention. Developing from its origins in the reinvigorated interest in mesmerism in the 1830s and 1840s, late nineteenth-century hypnotism attempted to make itself more palatable to contemporary scientific thought. The surgeon James Braid had tried to grant hypnotism a scientific distance from the supernatural stigma that still clung to mesmerism, shifting the explanation of the trance state from external invisible fluids to a psychological state to which the subject consented. 16 Yet, unable to completely extract itself from its occult resonances, hypnotism also became a cause for concern about crime, culpability, and the loss of will at the fin de siècle. This was given a degree of respectability in the late 1880s as the British medical profession briefly flirted with but ultimately rejected the idea of using hypnotism in medical practice. Openly debated in the British Medical Journal, this respected publication was not above talking up the potential for hypnotic crimes. 17 Its editor, Ernest Hart, claimed the hypnotized would become "blindly, actively obedient to your wildest orders or most bizarre suggestions," and this fed concern that a person could be induced to commit a crime while in a hypnotic state or even via posthypnotic suggestion. 18 Crimes committed by a hypnotized subject would effectively work around the law for they were committed unknowingly, without will or intention. In such circumstances, the subject was merely a tool of the true criminal, the hypnotiser.
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The British Medical Journal was obviously not the means by which most people became aware of hypnotism, its potential dangers, or its legal ambiguities. These notions entered into popular consciousness through the sensationalist claims made by newspapers, pamphlets, short stories, and novels in the 1880s and 1890s, perhaps the most popular of which was George De Maurier' s novel Trilby. 20 According to Luckhurst, the "Trilby-mania of 1894 familiarised a wider constituency into the possibilities of hypnosis" and, indeed, it is only from the later 1890s that one sees hypnotism being appropriated into defendants' explanations for criminal behaviors in the Old Bailey. 21 As such, some of the accused in late cases appear to have been aware of a shift in the expression of occult influences, possibly garnered from these popular fictions or the press, and attempted to employ it in their defense. That said, claims for diminished culpability for crimes on the basis of occult control are sparse.
A case from February 1882 was something of an exception. A servant, Maggie Nattrass, was charged with arson and damage to property for repeatedly setting fire to items in 10 Essex Road, Islington, the household in which she was employed. The mistress of the household testified that Nattrass had on several occasions said that "she could not tell how it was, everything she touched turned to fire, she thought she was bewitched-she said that to me three or four times." 22 On the way to the police station she had stated, "I don't know what made me do it; I do not remember anything about it." The police officer testified that Nattrass' s "manner seemed strange, and her eyes wandered," while another witness testified that "the prisoner complained of her head . . . and her eyes looked queer." 23 Despite the potential for a psychological interpretation of Nattrass' s pyromania and her beliefs in bewitchment, the court made nothing of the issue of possible mental illness or bewitchment raised respectively by a friend of the prosecutor and a witness for the prisoner. In this case no medical authority was even consulted. Becoming bogged down in legal wrangling over whether Nattrass' s crime should be considered a felony or a misdemeanor, the judge, Mr. Justice Hawkins, eventually issued a verdict of not guilty.
A later case from 1906 offers a rare match with the previous decade' s fictional vogue for the threat of hypnotic control. It also appears to be a rather opportunistic attempt to retrospectively apply a pseudoscientific idea of recent cultural interest as justification for previous crimes. Arthur Bennett, a forty-year-old carman (merchandise transporter), pleaded guilty to wounding Thomas Smith about the head with an iron bar. While in this instance he claimed to have been driven to it by homelessness and desperation, Bennett had a list of crimes dating back to 1888. These he "attributed . . . to hypnotism." Unfortunately the POB did not record details of this claim. While this may have been presented as justification for a lack of control over his previous actions, Dr. James Scott of Brixton Prison, a medical witness who had observed Bennett, testified that the defendant was mentally fit and had known right from wrong at the time of his attack on Smith. With his medical expertise dependent on firsthand empirical observation, neither Scott nor the court could entertain Bennett' s claims about the influence of hypnotism. Scott' s medical testimony regarding Bennett' s recent mental lucidity deftly sidestepped the reference to hypnotism and appears to have influenced the jury. Unpersuaded by his reference to hypnotism, they found Bennett guilty and he was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.
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These cases indicate the fact that the epistemological shift in occult explanations did not derive in a neat, linear manner from proclamations made by medical authorities in the courtroom. Tilbrook' s self-justification, Nattrass' s apparent incomprehension, and Bennett' s seeming opportunism suggest that the accused, and in William Burns' s case possibly even the victim, were willing to employ these ideas as part of their testimony. Introduced as narrative assertions, evasions, and quite possibly manipulations to signify mental instability, they, too, helped contribute to the production of an epistemic discourse on the nature of the occult. From the viewpoint of the accused (and the lawyers or medical experts who spoke on their behalf ), occult beliefs in external control helped blur the divide between victim and criminal. They also serve as examples of the persistent yet evolving belief in the influence of remote powers, the threat of external agents, and risks to the inviolable self-ideas that, for some, remained so strong that they could (be claimed to) drive people to maim or murder.
pathologizing the occult Although "mad doctors" had played a role in trials since the mid-eighteenth century, the Victorian courtroom witnessed the growing presence of medical experts and testimony. 25 By the late 1840s medical experts were already testifying in 90 percent of insanity trials that involved assault. 26 While lay witnesses could only testify to physiological signs of mental illness based on "common sense" deductions, the court granted medical experts greater freedom to make inferences and authoritative speculations based on their observations, experience, and knowledge. Eigen argues that the authority of the emerging medical expert was founded on convincing the court and the jury that they could not rely on surface impressions of madness, nor simply use the crime as evidence of such, but that "there was something rather more to madness than acting like a madman."
27 Mental illness, like occult influence, was invisible, and in advancing their interpretations medical authorities attempted to insinuate their will and knowledge into the minds of the accused and juries alike.
The favoring of a psychological interpretation of the occult in Old Bailey trials can be situated as part of a longer trend that reached back into the eighteenth century. Castle has argued that an urge toward the "internalisation of the spectral: the gradual reinterpretation of ghosts and apparitions as hallucinations, or projections of the mind," dated back to Enlightenment skepticism and the formulation of "apparition theory" in the early nineteenth century. Yet she also observes how this resulted in the "uncanny ' spectralization' of human psychology" itself. 28 As such, a medical discourse that tried to resituate occult influence as pathological thought could not wholly free itself of haunting associations. This attempt to pathologize ghosts was subsequently extended to spiritualism, and Old Bailey cases in the half century after 1860 demonstrate an attempt to continue to expand this internalizing to incorporate any occult-related paranoia. 29 Courtroom medical interpretations that promoted such a view were facilitated by the noted transition in occult influence from the supernatural to the psychical, for these ideas were already moving toward a field of epistemological understanding that was located in the mind. By pursuing this trend inward, mental scientists appropriated the language of external occult "powers," "forces," or "influences" and transformed them into their internal, psychological variants. The terminology may have stayed the same, but their reference and location had been fundamentally altered. In doing so, medical authorities could administer to what they perceived as the repositioned source of occult belief-misguided thought and mental fabrications. Although the Old Bailey was a site in which occult and medical ideas intersected, they did not directly collide. This was largely due to the administrative structure of courtroom procedure. The courtroom was a performative, storytelling space, with a set format for the order in which narratives were delivered: first the victims, then witnesses for the prosecution, witnesses for the defense, those who spoke for the character of the accused, and then (sometimes) statements from the accused themselves. 30 Whereas Old Bailey court cases had previously involved an imbalanced confrontation between the accused and a prosecutor, the passing of the 1836 Prisoner' s Counsel Act led to a more professional, adversarial courtroom culture. The plaintiff and defendant increasingly surrendered their agency to competing lawyers who spoke on their behalf, cross-examined witnesses, and directly addressed the jury. 31 While the occult beliefs of the accused were discussed, the supposed believers themselves had limited opportunity to explain their ideas. The court rendered them powerless while giving room to medical testimony that contested the existence of the occult from mental scientific perspectives.
There was potential for this interaction between medical practitioners and lawyers to be mutually self-serving. Acting as courtroom experts enabled doctors of mental science to bolster their evolving yet still uncertain professional credibility in a period when professionalism was a way of erecting disciplinary boundaries and garnering authority. 32 In turn, their medical testimony could also serve a purpose for lawyers. External occult possession or theft of will was a crime that the law could not legislate against; like witchcraft, the causal factor was remote and unprovable. To solve this problem the Old Bailey court seemed to condone medical testimony that challenged the ontological status and nature of the occult, repositioning it from an unknown external influence to an internal one conceived as pathological defect or physiological disorder. In eradicating remote influence and relocating it in the mind of the accused a causal link was formed that could be recognized and processed by the law in terms of self-control and moral comprehension. In the process, trials were often transformed from cases of assault or murder to insanity.
These shifts in the presentation of occult ideas would have obviously been favored by advocates for the defense. Criminal law was based on "the legal subject as a rational being with cognitive capacity," one whose intentions could be held responsible for criminal consequences. Through presenting occult notions of influence as symptomatic of mental illness, medical testimony had the potential power to destabilize the legal subject as a rational being, to blur their status as criminal and also victim, and to throw into uncertainty their legal culpability. 33 The medical internalization of the occult also conveniently allowed the court to sidestep any metaphysical speculation. Prosecuting lawyers may well contest the strength of a particular medical interpretation or, more commonly in the cases discussed below, the jury might reject it, but neither appeared to challenge the underlying psychological premise that was being advanced. What they questioned was not the transformation of occult beliefs into symptoms of insanity, but the disputed nature of the insanity that those occult beliefs appeared to signify.
The struggle to clarify legal definitions of insanity preceded this mid-to late-nineteenth-century epistemological shift in medical representations of the occult. Prior to 1800 only a case of total insanity could lead to an acquittal. However, the 1830s and 1840s saw an increasing awareness of the complexity of insanity, with the identification of specific manias, monomanias, and notions of moral insanity. 34 The 1843 M'Naghten Rules marked an attempt to fix a definition of criminal insanity and the operation of the insanity defense in jurisprudence. Attempting to legally accommodate changing understandings of madness, the M'Naghten Rules declared that the accused had to be acquitted of legal culpability if it could be demonstrated that he or she had not known the difference between right and wrong at the time of the act. This originally required evidence of "a defect of reason" or mental delusion, but later it came to include the emerging idea of moral insanity; one could be conscious of the act but so "carried away by perverse sentiments" that the accused was rendered a victim of "a will out of control." 35 While references to the accused seeing devils and ghosts as evidence of mental instability can be found in early nineteenth-century cases and beyond, they could now be read as signifiers of the "perverse sentiments" required by the law. 36 For example, shortly after strangling her husband on the night of 21 April 1855, Rebecca Turton told an acquaintance that she "saw fairies and dead people at the side of the road" as they returned to the rooms in Richard Street, Bromley, where she had left the corpse. Although citing the supernatural as indicative of an unstable or even insane mind, Turton' s insanity does not appear to have been a consistent mental state. Gilbert McMurdo, the surgeon at Newgate Prison, had considered her insane and had her moved to Bethlehem Hospital, but the hospital soon deemed her sane and returned her to Newgate. Finding no sign of insanity, McMurdo had felt "there was nothing to prevent her standing trial." 37 McMurdo' s medical testimony seemed to operate within the M'Naghten Rules, for it suggested Turton may have been incapable of recognizing her wrongdoing at the time of the murder but had subsequently regained her sanity. As with many such cases, the jury rejected the notion of temporary or inconsistent insanity. She was found not guilty on the grounds of insanity but detained. 38 Although the drive toward an internalizing of occult beliefs located it in the developing field of psychiatry, medical authorities often drew attention to physiological and delusionary signifiers to underpin their explanation. This was evident in the case of Adelaide Cole with which this article began. Prior to the murder of her child, her physician, Dr. Rogers, had described Cole as being "in very bad health physically," and when he attended to her after the murder "she complained of pains in her head." While Cole claimed evil spirits had compelled her to kill her son, the more persuasive medical interpretation presented by Rogers was that this tragedy arose from internal, mental issues fostered by her poor health, and possibly a mind overstimulated by too much reading; it was stated, for example, that she had spent the morning before the murder reading the Bible. 39 Alluding to a disciplinary authority that was still very much in formation in the 1860s, Rogers commented that what "is known in the profession as a homicidal monomania . . . is frequently produced by religious delusions." Here he appeared to be building on comments by two previous witnesses who stated that Cole "was very fond of reading the Bible" and that she believed "the wrath of God was upon her." Drawing on signifiers linked to bodily health, reading habits, and imagination, Rogers was able to transform what the accused believed to be a loss of will to external occult influence into an internalized loss of control over her own mental faculties. As he stated, in his opinion Cole had been "incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the act." 40 This was a clear attempt by Rogers to ensure his medical interpretation conformed to the M'Naghten Rules, structuring his statements to what by the 1860s had become an established legal determination for an insanity plea.
This was very much in line with neurological and physiological causes of supernatural beliefs set down by the prominent alienist Henry Maudsley. He claimed that in the sound mind such ideas could be explained through "defects and errors of human observation and reasoning" or the "prolific activity of the imagination," while in the unsound mind they could be attributed to hallucinations, illusions, manias, and delusions. 41 Particularly relevant to Cole' s case was Maudsley' s assertion that "in the delirium of insanity it is not an uncommon thing for the sufferer to see and hear persons who are the mere phantom creations of his disordered brain; and when the delirium is of an acute character these . . . have such full possession of his senses, usurp his attention so entirely, that real persons and voices can make no impression upon him." 42 Medical experts often drew on a range of indicators to suggest a diagnosis of insanity, usually referencing physiological abnormalities and family history, particularly suicides. 43 Occasionally allusions to occult ideas were woven into this signaling of mental instability, although they were not necessarily portrayed as direct influences on criminal actions. In a murder case from October 1904 the court heard that the accused, twenty-three-year-old Albert James Holmes, had "been reading a great deal of literature lately on hypnotism" and some of this material had been handed to the police following his arrest. James Scott, the medical officer at Brixton Prison, had had Holmes under observation and they had discussed "his reading various books on hypnotism and mesmerism." The medical officer openly dismissed them in court, stating, "I have seen them, they may be read by anybody-they are sold in London, and are very silly pamphlets." He suggested that any influence they may have had on Holmes' s killing of his infant nephew was indirect, noting that for those inclined toward mental instability "very little would tilt some weak minds over to insanity." Seemingly aware that such a claim amounted to little more than speculation, Scott' s medical testimony promoted the significance of physiological explanations over occult reading matter, citing how a discharge from Holmes' s ear had coincided with his mother' s noting a change in his character, "one of the earliest symptoms of mental disturbance." It was also suggested that his childhood paralysis was thought to be "associated with mental impairment" while a family history of suicide suggested a genetic predisposition toward mental instability. 44 Although incorporated as part of a multicasual medical explanation of insanity, the occult dimension remained a notable signifier of delusion, for the preternatural status of such ideas could serve as a pointed suggestion that mental processes had slipped beyond the bounds of "normality." A case from August 1910 offers a useful illustration. George Gordano Hackshaw, a thirty-threeyear-old decorator, was charged with the manslaughter of his younger brother, William, following their fight in Plashett Road, East Ham. When Hackshaw surrendered himself to the police he stated, "I believe my brother hypnotises me.
It has been going on for months, and I believe he had some influence over my wife as well." He had not intended to kill his brother and it was not an attempt to reassert his will against hypnotic control. Sydney Dyer, the medical officer of Brixton Prison who had had Hackshaw under observation since the killing, reported that in discussion he had said "of late he has had a lot of trouble with his head; that his dreams have been so terrifying that he is kept awake all night; that this has been going on for some five months, and that it is entirely due to hypnotic influences exercised over him by his brother and others." Building on Hackshaw' s "delusion as to hypnotism" as an expression of insanity, Dyer informed the court that once he was in Brixton Prison, Hackshaw' s belief in remote influence and the permeability of minds had transformed. Hackshaw had told Dyer that he could "by some magnetic power diagnose by his own feelings the different ailments of the other prisoners in the ward, as he feels exactly the same pains as they have." Addressing the issue of legal culpability, Dyer stated that at the time of the fight Hackshaw "knew the nature of the act, but he did not know it was wrong, as his mind was so absolutely warped by these delusions that his judgment was entirely in abeyance. It was acting on those delusions that he committed the offence." In this case at least, Dyer' s pathological reading of Hackshaw' s belief in hypnotic and magnetic influences seems to have convinced the judge, who then influenced the jury, for Mr. Justice Hamilton directed them "to find a verdict of guilty, but insane." 45 As such, medical testimony tended to reposition occult beliefs so as to imply something other than itself. Consequently, occult beliefs became a mere signifier within a narrative of mental instability, one that frequently sought to transform the accused into a victim, not of external occult control but of their own internal mental delusions. In this context, occult elements served to create uncertainty around legal culpability and had a potentially transformative effect on the status of the accused in the eyes of the jury. Appropriated into and serving the epistemological understandings of medical experts, the occult could still have a remote influence over the minds of others.
the influence of medical epistemologies
In reflecting on how occult ideas were reformulated as indicators of insanity we have to appreciate that the influence of medical interpretations was not necessarily as robust or authoritative as the previous section may suggest. As has already been indicated in several cases, the Old Bailey was a forum involving a range of actors with varying degrees of influence, each having the potential to inform the production, manipulation, and acceptance (or not) of a pathologized understanding of occult ideas. The effectiveness of this discourse was determined, in part, by issues internal to Victorian mental science, a discipline that was still in the process of evolving as a field of knowledge and as a profession during this period. Yet it was also influenced by the nature of the medical "experts" who appeared in court, by ongoing tensions between medical and legal definitions of insanity, and by the biases of the jurors they attempted to persuade.
Late Victorian mental science was far from a coherent body of epistemic authority against which occult epistemologies might be broken. There were a number of issues that bedeviled the emerging field and the courtroom medical experts who spoke for it. The science of the mind encompassed physiological, neurological, and psychological dimensions, and this hybridity made it unclear whether the science of the mind was presenting itself as "an objective or subjective science." 46 The problem for such an approach, at least from the perspective of building professional boundaries, was that the more mental medicine focused on physiology (for example) the more it seemed to be encroaching on a preexisting field. Unlike medical knowledge of anatomy, but like the occult it attempted to naturalize and psychologize, mental science had no tangible existence that an empirically minded medical community could test. Linked to this, there was a clamor of conflicting interpretations regarding the mind, mental illness, apparitions, and the susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion. This was best represented by divisions between French schools of psychiatry and, allied to this, the debate over the therapeutic uses and risks of hypnotism within the British medical profession. French mental medicine was at the forefront of nineteenth-century studies of hypnotism but was split over the question of which type of patient was more susceptible to hypnotism. While Chalcot suggested his neurotic and hysterical (and therefore weak-willed or abnormal) patients at Salpetriere, Paris, made the best subjects, the calm, therapeutic approaches of Hippolyte Bernheim at Nancy suggested a more universal susceptibility to hypnotic influence. 47 Closer to home, there were also conflicting views over how far one' s character could be overpowered by mesmerism. Despite sensationalist fears about a complete loss of self-control (and therefore a negation of legal culpability) under occult influence, James Coates' s 1904 Human Magnetism or How to Hypnotise claimed mesmerists could not do anything contrary to the moral will of the subject. Acts performed under mesmeric influence, even criminal ones, had to accord with their natural disposition. 48 As such, we can see a medical scientific episteme being advanced in occultrelated court cases, but it is harder to say exactly whose collective view, if any, it represented. If mental science' s epistemological claims about insights into occult ideas were as much rhetorical as empirical, then the conflicting voices of the emerging psychiatric profession weakened the authority of any particular interpretation.
These were further destabilized by a blurring of the demarcation between science and the occult across this period. Spiritualism drew on pseudoscientific terminology and empirical approaches "in order to authenticate, verify, and categorize the supernatural," while members of the Society for Psychical Research emulated the conduct of mainstream science (from which many were drawn) as a way of distinguishing themselves as "more scientific" than spiritualists. 49 While science sought to enforce a distinction between the supernatural and the natural, typically with an eye to either debunking or appropriating supposed aspects of the former into the latter, the modern occult risked the "collapse of the poles of this defining dichotomy by insisting that the supernatural [was] natural." 50 Grimes has illustrated how mental scientists' repeatedly used the terms "mesmerism" and "hypnotism" interchangeably in manuals of the 1890s. As such, while hypnotism leaned toward a more scientific basis it could not fully escape mesmerism' s "supernatural and sinister implications," thereby leaving "the mind at the fin de siècle . . . a supremely haunted site." 51 Such developments served to compromise the boundaries of science while possibly garnering respect for previously discredited preternatural ideas.
The potential persuasiveness and authority of psychological interpretations becomes even less secure when we take a closer look at medical "experts" in occult-related cases. Many Old Bailey cases suggest that medical witnesses were not required to be noted experts in a particular field. They were commonly hospital or prison medical officers or surgeons, and their credibility as medical experts often appeared to rely on little more than the status of their position within a medical or penal institution. 52 In most cases they had spent time observing the prisoner while in confinement, though in at least one case the observation was very brief. 53 This emphasis on prisoner observation was an attempt on the part of these officers and surgeons to fashion themselves as empirical scientists. During prisoner observation they could test for ruses, the sustainability of delusions, and the nature of an individual' s madness, be it a particular monomaniac fixation or a broader derangement. Somewhat surprisingly, then, several medical "experts" made open reference to not having personal experience in the suggested mental illness, particularly homicidal mania. Instead, they fell back on their reading. Dr. Rogers, Adelaide Cole' s physician, could not state conclusively whether she had suffered from monomania or homicidal mania. He admitted that he had "not given particular attention to diseases of the brain," and that "I do not speak from experience but from books-the cases alluded to in the books are, I believe, recent, but I cannot swear it." This did little to bolster his authority as an expert. He compensated by emphasizing that his opinion that she had not been in a sound mental state at the time of the crime was based on "the result of my observations." 54 From the court' s perspective his expertise lay not with any detailed specialist knowledge of mental illness but with his familiarity with Adelaide Cole' s mental and physical condition.
Although judges and lawyers had condoned the increasing presence of medical experts in court, there were ongoing tensions over who was best placed to make judgments on criminal responsibility and exculpatory insanity pleas. As Newton Ainsley puts it, "The medical and legal professions wrestled one another for authority over the insanity acquittal." 55 These tensions did not simply arise from medical testimony being challenged in court, although "cross-examined by prosecutors, criticised by judges and rebuffed by juries" some medical witnesses sought legal changes that would recognize their authority. 56 Underlying this was the unresolved perpetuation of differing medical and legal definitions of insanity. Although shaping their testimony to the wording of the M'Naghten Rules, doctors of mental science were frustrated by the narrow legal conceptualization of madness. In particular, the physicalist reference to evidence of "a disease of the mind" was viewed as "a strategic move, designed to discount clinical concepts such as 'moral insanity,' 'lesions of the will' and 'monomania.'" These failings prompted some medical writers to call for "the determination of insanity to be transferred from the jury to some form of specialist tribunal, presided over by experts on mental aberration." 57 For their part, judges and lawyers were determined to ensure that decisions regarding insanity and criminal responsibility should reside with juries, not a medical elite. In the cases cited here, it was not lawyers who hindered a pathologized repositioning of the occult as a signifier of mental derangement (although one has to acknowledge that the Old Bailey transcripts do not always give a full account of cross-examinations). Rather, the rejection of certain medical presentations of insanity came from the jury-that decisive element within the courtroom that was least versed in medical or legal understanding, and perhaps most representative of the wider public' s views on occult influence and insanity.
58 Juries appear to have been particularly resistant when medical authorities tried to advance claims for the temporary insanity of the accused.
The power of medical testimony to influence juries only partially was seen in the case of Dr. Charles Grimes. In the early hours of 25 April 1876, the occupants of 57 Euston Square had been woken by Grimes, a surgeon, pulling up the carpet, moving furniture, and shouting as if he were "quite a maniac" in his second-floor lodging. The police had to force entry into his room and, armed with a gun, he wounded two officers in the ensuing struggle, one seriously. In custody Grimes told the police that somebody on the floor below "was mesmerising him." He later said the mesmerist "was trying to throw him out [of ] the window by force . . . and that there were wires from the room below to his room" that aided the mesmerist' s influence over him. 59 What makes this case notable is the unanimous judgment of three medical witnesses-namely, that Grimes had suffered a temporary bout of insanity. The doctors all emphasized their experience or position to help establish their authority and to exert influence over the court. Dr. Richard Parramore stated, "I have seen several cases of delusion, and to the best of my judgment he was suffering under delusion at that time" and "was evidently insane." Grimes had not slept for several nights before the incident and had taken a large dose of opium as a sedative. This, Parramore claimed, "might cause delirium" and could have fed Grimes' s paranoia that "somebody below was making him an experiment for mesmerism." John Rowland Gibson reported that he had been "medical officer at Newgate Prison for nearly twenty-one years" and had seen "a great many cases involving insanity." It was he who advanced the idea of temporary insanity, claiming "there is insanity which surrounds the commission of an act leaving the person sane afterwards; it may last for a short time and pass away." He claimed Grimes had regained "perfect possession of his faculties" and had come to recognize his beliefs about the mesmerist in the room below as a delusion. Finally, Joseph Hill had had Grimes under his charge at the lunatic ward of St. Pancras workhouse since the incident. Hill stated, "I have made insanity my study" and "the strongest indication of insanity is delusion and [Grimes] was suffering from delusion." Hill added that he agreed with the interpretations provided by Gibson and Parramore. If this unanimous medical verdict was an attempt to save a fellow medical practitioner it failed. The jury found Grimes not guilty but, unconvinced that he had only suffered a temporary bout of insanity, had him detained.
Drawing on the influence of their experience, observations, and institutional positions, the three medical men successfully influenced the jury into accepting the repositioning of Grimes' s claims about mesmerism as mental delusion and signifier of a paranoid mentality, but failed to persuade them that such a defect could be merely temporary. The outcomes of both Grimes' s case and that of William Burns mentioned above suggest juries were willing to accept medical claims about insanity but tended to be unconvinced by complex and uncertain notions of temporary insanity. Once the idea of psychological pathology was introduced into proceedings, the response tended to be to err on the side of caution and assume insanity' s influence continued to linger beneath apparent displays of restored mental coherence, regardless of the judgment of medical experts. What this seems to imply is that while medical witnesses wanted to claim professional insight into occult ideas and their connection to mental instability, the jury suspected that medical officers were themselves not above being deceived by individuals who were both cunning and insane. Rather than passively absorbing a particular medical diagnosis they responded to certain parts but rejected others. The law had long sought a clear definition of insanity and related issues of legal culpability. As medical experts attempted to increasingly complicate those issues, juries were (understandably, in the context of their role in court) inclined to favor established legal definitions of insanity over developing medical ones. 60 A final case illustrates the fact that these medical scientific epistemologies had not come to wholly dominate by the Edwardian period. Given that this case marks an unusually direct confrontation between epistemological understandings, it is worth exploring at some length. On 8 September 1908 Tom Wallis Rogers, a forty-year-old "magnetic healer . . . medical hypnotist and mesmerist," openly challenged medical authority in the Old Bailey courtroom. Rogers was accused of having obtained £14/15 (fourteen pounds, fifteen shillings) from Emma Elizabeth Ling, a parlor maid, through false pretenses. Ling had had her right eye removed in 1899 and had since worn a glass one. Rogers had convinced Ling that he could use his magnetic powers to grow her a new eye. Ling stated in court that she had believed him. Rogers' s treatment had involved "tapping movements upon the spine." After their first session Rogers told Ling "that the front layer of the eye was formed" and that he was "satisfied that the eye would become a fact." However, after several months of treatment Ling went to the Middlesex Hospital, where she was informed the supposed growth was merely the stump of her old eye.
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Dr. Nathaniel Harman, an ophthalmic assistant at the Middlesex Hospital, was called as a medical expert. He openly stated the impossibility of being able to grow a new eye. However, Rogers, citing his fifteen years of study and experience in "applied psychology and the law of magnetism," contested the legal charge, Harman' s judgment and, more broadly, medical orthodoxy. He declared that he had not taken money under false pretenses because "I distinctly told the lady that I had never accomplished such a thing and that so far as I knew it had never been accomplished," although he added, regardless of "the opinion of Dr. Harman, or of the whole medical profession, or the fact that it has never been accomplished, there is no proof that it is impossible." Rogers suggested the growing of an eye was "nothing unnatural" if one understands the law of nature and if "the practitioner has the power or force necessary to deal with those properties which go to make a natural eye." As far as he was concerned, "the opinion of the medical profession upon a matter wherein they have no education or experience, whereon they have not even thought, is worthless." As such, he was not trying to naturalize preternatural powers but viewed his magnetic abilities as inherently natural.
Although willing to contest the limitations of contemporary medical knowledge, Rogers fared less well when the frame of reference was shifted from ophthalmic science to psychiatry. William Norwood East, deputy medical officer at Brixton Prison, had been observing Rogers since his admission. He found him to be of "unsound mind and incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his offence." Rogers had told Norwood East that he was "capable of giving people new hearts, liver, and kidneys; that he can raise the dead; that he can break bones and heal them in five minutes by putting his finger on them; he says that by placing his finger on the bones they melt, then on his removing his finger they solidify and become like shell; . . . I believe all these are genuine insane delusions." Underlining the point for the jury, Judge Lumley Smith asked, "You mean that he pretends to medical powers which you consider impossible and improbable and that that shows he is mad?" Norwood East replied, "Yes."
The revelation that Rogers had suffered from a nervous breakdown two years earlier aided the transition from unorthodox powers to mere mental delusion, from external influence to internal deception. Despite reasonable grounds for an insanity case, Rogers was found guilty and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment for deception. Indicative of the judge' s rather antiquated views on signifiers of insanity, Lumley Smith stated that Rogers had not displayed "any sign of want of intellect." Such an understanding bypassed the M'Naghten Rules and seemed to refer to legal definitions of insanity that harked back to the turn of the nineteenth century. Rogers was to "be kept under observation, and if he was found to be insane he would be treated accordingly." Unlike in previous cases, one senses Rogers may have been punished for his direct challenge to both the legal charge and the still malleable boundaries between orthodox and heterodox sciences at the turn of the twentieth century.
Ultimately, the use of occult beliefs as a signifier of mental instability reveals the limitations of late Victorian mental science. Delusion was not the initiating cause of mental illness but merely a symptom of such. As Henry Maudsley declared, it was "not in our power to explain psychologically the origin and nature" of delusions, merely "to establish their existence as facts of observation, and to set forth the pathological conditions under which they are produced." 62 In court it was sufficient for medical experts to signify that ideas of bewitchment, spirit, mesmeric, or hypnotic influence were indicative of delusion and not probe any deeper. As such, medical testimony sought to reduce the occult to a mere fictive element in a mental scientific narrative that alluded to but ultimately could not specify the nature of the mental defect. The workings and failings of the mind remained as unknown as the occult itself.
conclusion
Rather than delineating the preternatural, the intersection of occult and mental scientific epistemologies in a legal context has emphasized blurring and transitioning, from notions of external to internal influence, with an accompanying destabilization of boundaries between criminal and victim, prisoner and patient, the psychical and the insane. The larger, broader blurring, however, appears to be that between enchantment and disenchantment. One is struck by the resonances among occult, legal, and medical influences over the mind and body of the individual in the late nineteenth-century courtroom. Although ostensibly an agency of disenchantment, the operation of the law court reproduced many of the effects of occult influence in this period. Like witchcraft, the laws' influence and controlling power were unseen but their effects were made manifest through words, rituals, and their real-world consequences. Like the witches' curse, the law was "that version of the word which has immediate physical effects, of incarceration . . . of pain, of death." 63 Like the occult control of will believed to be exercised by mesmerists, ideas they sought to dispel or negate, medical and legal authorities required the accused/victim to surrender will, personal agency, and, if detained, bodily volition, to the authorities' interpretations and control.
Under the influence of medical experts, the loss of control over one' s mind was not considered to be due to external occult realities but to a pathologized medical repositioning of such ideas as internal delusion. While the expression of occult ideas remained the same, their epistemological reinterpretation fundamentally altered their nature, rendering them (and usually their accompanying paranoia) into a symptom of mental illness. In doing so the occult' s persistent challenge of incomprehensibility was, if not answered, at least relocated to a site that was comprehensible to both medical and legal authorities. Chettiar has observed that the shift from supernatural to psychical beliefs marked a transition from educated commentators' anxieties about lingering irrationality to their concern about the suggestibility of the masses. 64 Yet it was through the suggestibility of psychological interpretations of the occult that this epistemological sleight of hand was asserted, albeit in a rather problematic fashion. Consequently, scholars should be encouraged to consider more closely the occult nature of medical and legal discourses and institutions themselves. While medical and penal institutions have long been read as sites of controlling power discourses, that power has been understood as a resolutely secular one. In exploring legal and medical frameworks as mechanisms of disenchantment and naturalization, we should take care not to overlook their own occult-like propensities and operations. He is also the director of the Supernatural Cities project, a multidisciplinary research initiative that encourages collaboration among scholars, fiction writers, artists, and other creatives. His research interests revolve around the supernatural, the occult, the monstrous, and the fantastical in the modern period. 
